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Process and System Design
for Naval Battle Groups
Mark E. Nissen and Elias Oxendine IV
Naval Postgraduate School, USA
INTRODUCTION
Interest in and attention to knowledge management have exploded recently.
But integration of knowledge process design with information system design has
long been missing from the corresponding literature and practice. The research
described in this paper builds upon recent work focused on knowledge management
and system design from three integrated perspectives: 1) reengineering process
innovation, 2) expert systems knowledge acquisition and representation, and 3)
information systems analysis and design. With this work, we now have an integrated
framework for knowledge process and system design that covers the gamut of
design considerations from the enterprise process in the large, through alternative
classes of knowledge in the middle, and on to specific systems in the detail. We
illustrate the use and utility of the approach through an extreme enterprise example
addressing Navy carrier battle groups in operati nal theaters, which addresses many
factors widely considered important in the knowledge management environment.
Using this integrated methodology, the reader can see how to identify, select,
compose and integrate the many component applications and technologies required
for effective knowledge system and process design.
This  chapter appears in the book, Advanced Topics in Information Resources Management by Mehdi
Khosrow-Pour.
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KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM
DESIGN
The power of knowledge has long been ascribed to successful individuals in the
organization. But today it is recognized and pursued at the enterprise level through
a practice known as knowledge management (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). A cord-
ing to recent surveys of the literature (Nissen, Kamel & Sengupta, 2000), interest in
and attention to knowledge management (KM) have exploded recently, and many
prominent technology firms now depend upon knowledge-work processes to
compete through innovation more than production and service (McCartney, 1998).
Even a quick look through the trade press shows information technology (IT)
lies at the center of most knowledge management projects today. But IT employed
to enable knowledge work appears to target data and information, as opposed to
knowledge itself (Ruggles, 1998). For instance, extant IT used to support knowl-
edge management is limited primarily to conventional database management
systems (DBMS), data warehouses and mining tools (DW/DM), intranets/extranets
and groupware (O’Leary, 1998). Arguably, just looking at the word “data” in the
names of many “knowledge management tools” (e.g., DBMS, DW/DM), we are not
even working at the level of information, much less knowledge.
We feel this contributes to difficulties experienced with knowledge manage-
ment to date. Knowledge is noted as being quite distinct from data and information
(cf. Davenport, DeLong & Beers, 1998; Nonaka, 1994; Teece, 1998). And it is naïve
to expect systems and tools developed to support data and information flows to prove
useful for supporting the flow of knowledge through the enterprise. For purposes of
this article, we draw from the literature and operationalize knowledge in terms of the
actions it enables (e.g., making good decisions, effecting appropriate behaviors).
The research described in this paper builds upon recent work (Nissen et al.,
2000; Oxendine & Nissen, 2001) focused on knowledge management and system
design from three integrated perspectives: 1) reengineering process innovation, 2)
expert systems knowledge acquisition and representation, and 3) information
systems analysis and design.  This recent work developed an integrated framework
for knowledge process and system design. Such a framework covers the gamut of
design considerations from the enterprise process in the large, through alternative
classes of knowledge in the middle, and on to specific systems in the detail. In this
paper, we demonstrate the application of this framework for integrated process and
system design using a knowledge-intensive process example from the U.S. Navy:
battle group theater transition. This method has been successfully applied to other
maritime processes (Nissen & Espino, 2000), and its application in this paper builds
on the fieldwork performed by Oxendine (2000).
In the sections that follow, we provide some background information drawn
from the knowledge management literature. We then summarize the prior work to
describe the framework for integrating knowledge process and system design. We
subsequently employ this design approach through a specific Navy battle group
example. This example addresses many factors widely considered important in the



















knowledge management environment (e.g., cross-functional virtual teams,
collaborative work, distributed tacit and explicit knowledge, both routine and
nonroutine work processes, a dynamic market/organizational environment) and
illustrates the use and utility of our integrated approach to analysis and design of
knowledge systems and processes. The final section closes with key conclusions
and implications for practice, in addition to a focused agenda for future research
along these lines.
Knowledge Management Background
In this section, we summarize background information from the knowledge
management literature. Drawing from Nissen et al. (2000) to help organize this
discussion, we employ a two-dimensional feature space of specific activities and
stages comprising knowledge management as a process. We begin discussion of the
first dimension by drawing from the literature to integrate a number of various life
cycle models emerging for managing knowledge.
Nissen et al. (2000) observe a sense of process flow or a life cycle associated
with knowledge management, and integrating their survey of the literature (e.g.,
Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Despres & Chauvel, 1999; Gartner Group, 1998; Nissen,
1999), they synthesize an amalgamated knowledge management life cycle model as
outlined in Table 1. Briefly, the “create” phase begins the life cycle, as new
knowledge is generated by an enterprise. The second phase pertains to the
organization, mapping or bundling of knowledge. Phase three addresses some
mechanism for making knowledge formal or explicit,  and the fourth phase concerns
the ability to share or distribute knowledge in the enterprise.  Knowledge application
for problem solving or decision making in the organization constitutes phase five, and
a sixth phase is included to cover knowledge evolution, which reflects organizational
learning through time.
The second dimension is termed knowledge management level and draws from
Nonaka (1994) and others (e.g., Despres & Chauvel, 1999). The knowledge
management level includes both individual and collective entities, the latter of
which are further distinguished between groups (e.g., relatively small collections
such as work teams or functional departments) and organizations (e.g., relatively
large collections such as enterprises or corporations). This dimension pertains to the
Model Phase 1    Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
       
Nissen Capture Organize Formalize Distribute Apply  
Despres and 
Chauvel 
Create Map/bundle Store Share/transfer Reuse Evolve 
Gartner Group Create Organize Capture Access Use  
Davenport & Prusak Generate  Codify Transfer   
Amalgamated Create Organize Formalize Distribute Apply Evolve 
 
Table 1: Knowledge management life cycle models (Adapted from Nissen et al.,
2000)
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reach of knowledge management through the enterprise. Combined with the life
cycle steps from above, we employ these levels to classify extant knowledge
management applications.
Drawing further from the prior research discussed above, we note the coverage
of extant systems and practices across these two dimensions–knowledge manage-
ment life cycle phase and knowledge management level–is patchy. For instance,
across all three knowledge management levels, numerous systems and practices are
identified from the literature to support three of the six life cycle phases: knowledge
organization, knowledge formalization and knowledge distribution. But relatively few
counterpart systems and practices are found to correspond with the other three
phases: knowledge application, knowledge evolution and knowledge creation.
We thus observe a relative abundance and dearth of systems and practices
available to support these respective phases of the KM life cycle (see Nissen et
al., 2000, for details).
Integrated Framework
The feature space of systems and technologies outlined above defines a
broad design space for KM systems. The design space is further defined and
constrained in this section by a set of contextual factors that impinge on the
implementation of these systems in organizations. In the prior research, three
complementary design methods are identified and integrated to address knowl-
edge management. These methods draw from business process reengineering
(BPR), expert systems (ES) development, and information systems (IS) analysis
and design. Each plays a key role in the progression of knowledge process
design, through knowledge analysis, and onto information system design. And a
key contribution of this prior work involves integration of these methods into a
single, coherent knowledge management design methodology.
To summarize, the prior researchers combine the two-dimensional feature
space from above with contextual analysis to outline an integrated framework for
knowledge process and system design. In short, one first analyzes the processes
associated with knowledge work performed in the enterprise. This step draws from
common reengineering methods (e.g., Davenport, 1993; Hammer & Champy, 1993;
Harrington, 1991). Each process of interest must be understood and analyzed–and
perhaps redesigned–to interpret the knowledge required for its effective perfor-
mance. For instance, a recently developed, measurement-driven redesign method
(cf. Nissen, 1998) can be particularly useful for identifying and treating process
pathologies in advance of system design.
The next step is to identify and analyze the underlying knowledge itself. The
two-dimensional framework for analysis–combining phases of the amalgamated
knowledge management life cycle with knowledge levels–facilitates this analysis.
And we draw from textbook knowledge engineering methods employed for devel-
opment of expert systems (cf. Russell & Norvig, 1995; Turban & Aronson, 2001).
Because such methods focus directly on knowledge–as opposed to data and



















information–analysis at this stage can obviate many problems associated with
knowledge management systems in development today. And as a useful side effect,
mechanisms such as rules, frames, semantic nets and similar knowledge engineer-
ing techniques can be used to represent enterprise knowledge, tacit as well as
explicit. Once represented in digital form, these techniques can support direct
application and evolution of knowledge. Recall from the discussion above that such
enhanced knowledge management activities are poorly supported by systems and
practices in use today.
In the third stage of analysis, one must assess the contextual factors associated
with the process of interest. Critical in this assessment is understanding the
organization and the nature of knowledge underlying the task. Specifically, Nissen
et al. (2000) indicate that organizational memory represents an important design
consideration, as do organizational structure and the incentives used to stimulate
workers to contribute knowledge to systems. Also key is the nature of knowledge
underlying process tasks. In particular, the distribution of canonical and non-
canonical knowledge and practices through the enterprise exerts strong constraints
over the types of systems that can be employed for knowledge management.
Finally, armed with results from these three levels of analysis (i.e., process,
knowledge, and context), one can then effectively analyze and design the informa-
tion systems required to automate and support knowledge work in the process. To
accomplish this final stage of analysis, traditional IS methods (e.g., use of data flow
diagrams, entity-relationship diagrams, object models and use cases) are employed.
We find it interesting to note, most current knowledge management projects start at
this (final) stage of analysis.
NAVAL BATTLE GROUP APPLICATION
This section applies the knowledge management framework from above to the
U.S. Navy battle group theater transition process (BGTTP). The BGTTP represents
an extreme process in terms of knowledge-transfer demands, so it serves as a useful
process for investigation and subsequent generalization of results. We begin with
background information pertaining to the BGTTP and describe our application to key
knowledge tasks that greatly impact the outcome of the deployment process. We
then address how a process and system can be designed to improve knowledge
transfer, both across time and between different organizations. This process is
described in considerable detail by Oxendine (2000).
BGTTP Background
As the United States Navy continues to support the naval strategic concept
“Forward … From the Sea” (Boorda, Dalton & Mundy, 1992) into the 21st century,
one of the Navy’s primary responsibilities is to maintain a forward presence
throughout the world and project power to possibly deter actions that may threaten
U.S. interests.  In order to support this objective, the Department of the Navy (DoN)





















maintains naval forces abroad and periodically deploys ships throughout the high seas
to protect U.S. interests.  With this, the Navy has long used the carrier battle group
(CVBG) as an instrument for power projection and forward presence.
The CVBG is a combat formation of ships and aircraft, which comprises a
principal element of U.S. national power projection capability.  It is the essential
foundation of U.S. ability to conduct operations envisioned in “Forward … From the
Sea.”  The CVBG includes capabilities sufficient to accomplish a variety of combat
tasks in war, and it serves a wide variety of functions in situations short of war. The
CVBG’s peacetime mission is to conduct forward presence operations to help shape
the strategic environment by deterring conflict, building interoperability, and respond-
ing, as necessary, to fast-breaking crises with the demonstration and application of
credible combat power (OPNAV, 1995).
In order to support this peacetime objective, the DoN periodically deploys
CVBGs to  theaters of U.S. interests (e.g., the Arabian Gulf).  Typically, a CVBG
remains on station for 3 months.  Subsequently, the CVBG personnel, equipment, and
support are relieved by another CVBG, which conducts a successive 3-month
deployment in theater. This periodic BG rotation continues four times a year or until
the theater is no longer deemed in need of battle group presence. In the case of battle
groups in the Arabian Gulf, for reference, such BG rotations have been recurring
since the Gulf War over a decade ago.
The transition from one CVBG to another in theater is facilitated by the
BGTTP.  The primary objective of this process is to capture and transfer knowledge
between CVBGs in order to reduce the arriving battle group’s (BG) theater
acclimation period. The acclimation period is the time it takes for the arriving BG
to become familiar with the new environment (e.g., understanding the nature and
seriousness of regional threats).  During each acclimation period, the arriving BG
is at some risk in terms of effectively responding to any indication and warning
(I&W) and engaging a potential threat accordingly if the immediate need arises.  The
current theater turnover process provides the arriving BG with explicit theater
background information, but the regional experience and local knowledge gained
through theater operations by the departing BG is not transferred well during the
process.  Although IT has helped facilitate the BGTTP, only data and information
are transferred at present, not knowledge.
If the arriving BG is to effectively conduct its peacetime and wartime missions,
it must possess as much knowledge of the theater in which it is operating as the
departing BG, the latter of which has been on station for 3 months.  By applying our
integrated knowledge process and system design method to the BGTTP, we seek to
significantly improve the flow of knowledge from one BG to another. As an objective,
one might then expect the arriving BG to perform on Day 1 of operations in theater
as effectively as the departing BG on its 90th day.
Because the BGTTP as a whole represents a large, complex process (e.g.,
involving roughly 15 ships, 15,000 people at sea, often off the coast of a hostile
nation), we focus this investigation on a relatively small, but absolutely critical,
subprocess associated with the transfer of knowledge acquired by naval intelligence



















officers. And through field research (Oxendine, 2000), we find a central component
of such intelligence officers’ knowledge pertains to the identification of patterns
and norms and trend analysis.
Specifically, learning to recognize patterns and norms represents the key
knowledge desired by CVBG commanders prior to entering the Arabian Gulf, and
the ability to perform trend analysis represents the key knowledge acquired on
station. Together, the identification and continued analysis of patterns and norms are
essential for planning and conducting safe and effective operations in the Arabian
Gulf. Tactically speaking, these activities are referred to as intelligence preparation
of the battlespace (IPB) and used primarily for I&W.  As per Naval Doctrine
Publication 2 (1994), IPB is the systematic and continuous analysis of the current or
potential adversary, terrain and weather in the battlespace.
Process Analysis
Drawing from the integrated framework above, the first step involves process
analysis. We perform this high-level analytical step in two increments. The first
involves the kind of process-redesign analysis that is customary in reengineering
engagements (cf. Davenport, 1993; Hammer & Champy, 1993). Such redesign
analysis focuses on work-process flows that we term horizontal processes, for their
representations are generally presented as directed graphs, with process activities
running horizontally across the page. This first increment of analysis provides
guidance for (re)designing the process, for example, to overcome process patholo-
gies. The second increment involves knowledge management aspects of the pro-
cess. Such knowledge management analysis focuses on cross-process flows that we
term vertical processes (cf. Nissen & Espino, 2000). These latter process represen-
tations are also generally presented as directed graphs. But the corresponding
process activities run vertically down the page, across the kinds of work-process
flows (i.e., horizontal processes) examined for redesign. We return to the concept
of vertical processes in a subsequent section below.
Redesign Analysis. The battle group intelligence process is delineated in
Figure 1. In this representation, process activities are denoted by nodes in a graph,
which are connected by edges to denote the flow of work through the process. Each
activity node also includes eight attributes to describe the corresponding work tasks:
1) activity name, 2) role of the agent responsible for its performance, 3) organization
associated with the activity, 4) inputs to the activity, 5) outputs from the activity, 6)
IT employed to support the activity, 7) IT employed to support communication, and
8) IT employed to automate the activity.
For example, in the first step of data collection, shipboard systems (e.g.,
networks, radios, radar and other sensors) receive and provide raw intelligence data
to users.  In this case, the user is an intelligence watchstander on a tactical I&W
watch, which involves vigilantly scanning and monitoring the environment in
search of potential threa s.  This watchstander is either part of the BG intelligence
staff (N2) or the carrier intelligence center (CVIC).  After the data are collected,





















the N2 staff or the CVIC intelligence analysis and reporting cell (A&R) uses various
IT applications to process the raw data and convert them into a usable form of
information. Subsequently, intelligence personnel conduct trend analysis by integrat-
ing, analyzing, evaluating, and interpreting the processed information.  The N2 staff
or the A&R uses various IT tools to incorporate the data and produce an intelligence
product that is distributed to the BG and destroyer squadron (DESRON) command-
ers. Commanders, in turn, integrate the intelligence product with their own experi-
ence and observations to produce actionable knowledge.
The representation in Figure 1 supports the kind of process analysis
generally associated with business process reengineering. And as noted above,
using this representation, one would strive to understand and possibly redesign
the process at this stage. We obtain diagnostic measurements from the process
and employ the KOPeR system (cf. Russell & Norvig, 1995) to support its
redesign. KOPeR is an expert system that automates and supports key aspects
of process redesign.
The key measurements are summarized in Table 2. From measured values
presented in the table, one can see the baseline process suffers from a number of
serious pathologies (e.g., sequential flows, process friction, and manual, paper-based
& labor-intensive processes). We return to use this diagnostic information to drive
process redesign in a subsequent section below.
Knowledge Management Analysis. To support integrated knowledge pro-
cess and system design, we extend the process diagram from Figure 1 to reflect its
performance throug  time and across different BGs. This extended process
Configuration Measure Value Diagnosis 
Parallelism 1.00* Sequential process flows 
Handoffs fraction 0.33 Friction 
Feedback fraction 0.16 OK 
IT support fraction 0.50 Manual process 
IT communication fraction 0.16 Paper-based process 
IT automation fraction 0.00* Labor-intensive process 
Table 2: Process measurements and diagnoses
* denotes theoretical extremum for a measure
Task: Collect1 Process1 Analyze1 Assess1 Produce1 Disseminate1
Agent: Watch IO A&R        A&R       A&R          A&R
Org: N2         N2     CVIC   CVIC     CVIC         CVIC
Input: Raw data Info         Anal        Assess      Intel
Output: Info          Anal        Assess    Intel          Knowledge
IT-S: Collect   Various                                  Office
IT-C: Network
IT-A:
Figure 1: Battle group intelligence process



















representation augments the horizontal process graph presented in Figure 1 to also
include vertical processes that flow across various work-process flows. This cross-
process perspective facilitates process design in terms of knowledge management
and is depicted in Figure 2.
Here, we show the same basic process flow (e.g., activities represented by
nodes and connected by directed edges) for two particular instantiations of the
process. In the first instantiation (activities with the subscript 1, e.g., “Collect1”), a
particular BG would perform each of the process activities (i.e., as represented by
nodes in the figure) at some point in time. At some other point in time, another
instantiation of the process (activities with the subscript 2, e.g., “Collect2”) would
proceed through the same process activities. However, this latter instantiation
involves a different BG team and is enacted at a later point in time (e.g., following
a 90-day deployment). A principal concern in terms of knowledge management
involves consistency and efficacy across process instantiations. This vertical
process provides the basis for knowledge flow in the enterprise.
For instance, prior research focused on the U.S. Coast Guard (Nissen & Espino,
2000) identified seven cross-process flows associated with the maritime-interdiction
process: 1) personnel assignment, 2) after-action review (AAR), 3) qualification, 4)
debrief, 5) training, 6) post-deployment debrief, and 7) IT support. These and other
vertical-process examples may also apply well to our BGTTP. But for space
considerations, we do not detail these processes here.  Clearly, the cross-process
flows represent the essence of knowledge management activities.
Knowledge Analysis. The second step involves knowledge analysis. For
integrated knowledge process and system design, we need to focus on vertical
processes as well as their horizontal, work-process counterparts. Prior to conducting
knowledge analysis, the organization’s mission and goals must be understood.
Subsequently, knowledge analysis involves identifying key knowledge within an






Collect2 Process2 Analyze2 Assess2 Produce2 Disseminate2
Figure 2: BG vertical processes





















organization and results in a thorough understanding of critical success factors
(CSFs). The term knowledge mapping could be substituted, with caution, for
knowledge analysis here. Knowledge analysis also identifies the key explicit and
tacit knowledge employed to make decisions and take action (Nissen et al., 2000).
CVBGs are capable of conducting a variety of missions depending on the
theater of operations and its geopolitical environment.  For CVBGs operating in the
Arabian Gulf, the key BG operations are Operation Southern Watch (OSW), led by
the BG commander, and maritime-interdiction operations (MIO), led by the
DESRON commander.  Each operation has a primary objective and CSFs as listed
in Table 3.  The success of each operation epends on the achievement of each CSF,
thus accomplishing the primary objective.
For both BG operations, intelligence is a significant factor and provides key
knowledge essential for success. Both operations require a high degree of situ-
ational awareness derived from trend analysis. The intelligence officer provides this
intelligence support to the BG commander and his staff for day-to-day decision
making regarding OSW and MIO. To develop and acquire the analytical skill
applied in trend analysis requires training, experience and specific knowledge, both
explicit and tacit.
Explicit knowledge of patterns and norms is accessible prior to deployment
Table 3: Mission objectives and critical success factors
Operation Sout ern Watch (OSW) 
Primary Objective 
! Enforce the No-Fly Zone in southern Iraq 
 
Critical Success Factors  
! High situational awareness (current, accurate intelligence)  
! Prevent violation 
! Complete air tasking order (ATO) 
! Good, reliable communication within theater 
! Adequate I&W of potential violation 
Maritime-Interdiction Operations (MIO) 
Primary Objective 
! Enforce economic sanctions against Iraq 
 
Critical Success Factors  
! High situational awareness (current, accurate intelligence)  
! Good, reliable communication within theater 
! Well-trained and properly equipped boarding crew  
! Sufficient assets for ship placement and boardings 
! Prevent violation 
 



















through various intelligence products, such as manuals, books, lessons learned and
training exercises. And the BG intelligence staff systematically relies on an 18-
month inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC) to prepare for deployment. The
IDTC’s primary purpose is to increase the unit’s readiness, teamwork and warfighting
skills. During the IDTC, the BG intelligence staff conducts exercises simulating
operations in the threat environment. These training exercises serve as an introduc-
tion to provide the intelligence staff with explicit theater knowledge of the threat and
operating environment. Prior to deployment, the N2 provides the BG and DESRON
commanders with known patterns and norms, which are used for deliberate planning.
As per NDP 2, in deliberate planning the commander’s emphasis is on developing a
carefully crafted plan for military operations.
Unlike such explicit knowledge, however, tacit knowledge used in trend
analysis is not readily accessible, and it is gained only through on-the-job training
(OJT) and experience. In other words, formal training during the IDTC provides
only explicit, not tacit, knowledge.  Tacit knowledge is necessary to classify
operations or activities as “normal” or “abnormal,” for instance, and such identifi-
cation is based on how each individual analyst evaluates and interprets the data. For
contrast with deliberate planning from above, classification of an activity or
operation as “abnormal” is used as I&W, which supports crisis-action planning.
In crisis-action planning, the commander’s emphasis is on quickly developing a
course of action to respond to an emergent crisis. Currently, the intelligence staff
acquires tacit knowledge required for support of such crisis-action planning only
through physical presence and operations in the Gulf. Thus, such tacit knowledge
represents the focus of our efforts to improve knowledge flow.
Contextual Analysis. The third step involves contextual analysis. As with
most organizations, explicit knowledge is readily available when required by BGs
(e.g., in the form of manuals, policies, intelligence reports). Table 4 outlines current
methods used to codify and transfer knowledge. But BGs do not codify tacit
knowledge required to perform their responsibilities because there is no organized
system in place to assist in transferring such knowledge.  Rather, the majority of tacit
knowledge is obtained, at the individual level, through OJT. Even when turnovers
are conducted via face-to-face meetings between arriving and departing BG
representatives (e.g., exchanging documents, providing briefings, answering ques-
tions), reading and hearing stories about I&W or crisis-planning activities are not the
same as identifying and experiencing them firsthand.
IS Analysis and Design. The fourth step involves IS analysis and design. To
reiterate from above, IT represents a powerful enabler of knowledge management.
But we find that process (re)design, along with knowledge and contextual analysis,
is necessary before implementing IT. For instance, the pathologies diagnosed above
(e.g., manual, paper-based, and labor-intensive processes) provide guidance for IT
applications at this stage of analysis, and contextual factors serve to highlight
constraints that require consideration at this stage.





















Table 4: Current BGTTP methods
In system analysis, the organization’s current procedures and information
systems used to perform organizational tasks are analyzed.  For trend analysis, there
is no formal IT system presently capable of capturing and sharing the departing
CVBG’s tacit knowledge and experience.  As indicated in the KOPeR diagnosis, the
current process lacks adequate IT in the support and communication areas.
In order to treat these pathologies, three requirements emerge for systems
to improve knowledge flow: 1) serves as a knowledge repository; 2) facilitates
knowledge exchange; and 3) captures and transfers tacit knowledge.   We use
these three requirements to guide development of corresponding BG intelli-
gence process redesigns.
BG Intelligence Process Redesigns
Recalling the KOPeR diagnosis of the intelligence process from above, the “as
is” trend analysis process requires improvement in IT support and communication.
In this current process, IT is not used to capture and exchange knowledge necessary
for effective trend analysis.  As a result, the intelligence staffs of CVBGs repeatedly
construct new knowledge bases that are common to, but not shared with, those of
other CVBG intelligence staffs.  Therefore, we focus on IT to correct the current
trend analysis process pathologies.
Specifically, we concentrate on knowledge repositories, groupware and
knowledge-based systems (KBS).  Knowledge repositories (e.g., via Web) are
relatively quick and easy to construct, but they require some degree of user
expertise and time to find specific desired knowledge because the user must
search manually. Conversely, KBS (e.g., expert systems, intelligent agents)
require minimum user expertise and time to find the desired knowledge, but
formal capture and organization of knowledge, which is required to construct the
 BGTTP Instruments 
Lessons Learned 
- Review on-station CVBG’s mid-cruise and end-of-cruise lessons learned via 
Web site, e-mail, or message traffic 
- Review 6 mos or less prior to deployment  
Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) 
  -    Access command Web sites  
- E-mail relieving fleet counterpart and others throughout course of 
deployment  
Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) 
- Initiate 18 mos prior to deployment 
- Increase unit’s readiness, teamwork and warfighting skills prior to 
deployment 
Message Traffic 
- Add relieving CVBG to message traffic list to receive routine message traffic 
- Receive departing CVBG’s message traffic 6 mos prior to deployment 
Phone 
- Use secure phone (STU III) when enroute to Gulf 
 



















knowledge base, can be difficult and time consuming. Groupware falls some-
where in between the two. Knowledge repositories, groupware and KBS are
employed in turn to redesign the BGTTP below.
Redesign 1: Knowledge Repositories. Through repositories, corporate
knowledge can be organized and saved for future use. Knowledge repositories
capture and maintain structured, explicit knowledge, usually in document form, for
use throughout an organization. There are three basic types of repositories: 1)
external knowledge (e.g., competitive intelligence), which refers to knowledge about
external entities, 2) structured internal knowledge (e.g., research reports, techniques
and methods), and 3) informal internal knowledge (e.g., discussion databases full of
know-how, sometimes referred to as “lessons learned”; see Davenport et al., 1998).
The knowledge applied in trend analysis is tacit: plain and simple know-how.
To transfer tacit knowledge from individuals into a repository, some sort of
community-based electronic discussion is often employed.  This type of knowledge
repository, a combination of structured internal and informal internal knowledge,
is an attempt to accelerate and broaden the traditional knowledge sharing that
happens with the socialization of newcomers, the generation of myths and stories
within communities of practice, and the general transmission of cultural rituals and
organizational routines (Davenport et al., 1998).
While such knowledge is relatively quick and easy to capture and store, unless
some means for effectively indexing and searching it is established, knowledge
stored in repositories can be very difficult to find, particularly under time constraints
(e.g., when in crisis mode). Unfortunately, such indexing and searching techniques
remain somewhat primitive at present and are the focus of current research. Thus,
repositories are principally limited to explicit knowledge at present and therefore
likely to be used mostly for deliberate planning.
Redesign 2: Groupware. Today, groupware is becoming more prevalent in
enterprises as a tool to help teams operate more effectively across geographical
distances and innovate by building on shared corporate knowledge.  Groupware is
software that permits two or more people to communicate and collaborate across
geographical and temporal boundaries, and it is the cornerstone for most electronic
knowledge sharing (Liebowitz, 1999). Groupware provides rich content and real
interactivity via presentations, demonstrations, e-whiteboards, chat, audio, and
video. Through groupware, people separated by space (and time) can interact using
many of the same rich communication media customarily employed for face-to-face
conversations. Although it is technically feasible to capture and store such groupware
interactions (e.g., in repositories of audio-video conversations), problems noted
above associated with organization and search remain and impede effective, timely
retrieval. This repository-focused application of groupware is, therefore, also
relegated principally to support of deliberate planning.
Alternatively, by using groupware interactions as surrogates for face-to-face
conversations, at least some tacit knowledge can be transferred in a way inconceiv-
able through formal reports (e.g., lessons learned), repositories (e.g., Web content)
or other textual approaches. Specifically, through real-time groupware interaction,





















personnel assigned to an arriving BG can participate in intelligence operations of the
BG on station through a moderate form of telepresence. Such, active participation
(even though remote) may lead to development of comparable levels of tacit
knowledge that are normally acquired by intelligence personnel on station through
OJT. This represents a substantial improvement over the repository approach from
above. But, of course, such tacit knowledge is ephemeral and likely to require
relearning on the successive BG transfer.
Redesign 3: Expert Systems. Expert systems (ES) are programs that assist
nonexperts in making decisions comparable to those of experts.  An expert system
emulates the interaction between user and expert in a specific domain (e.g.,
medicine, electronics, finance).   Unlike other KM technologies, which assume the
user already possesses knowledge about the subject, ES allow almost anyone to
solve problems and make decisions in a subject area.   ES capture part of an expert’s
decision-making knowledge, store it in a knowledge base, and allow its effective
dissemination to users through an interface (Frenzel, 1987; Liebowitz, 1999; Russell
& Norvig, 1995).
Given that an expert system has a knowledge base and an inferencing capability,
it can be used to assist the intelligence staff in conducting trend analysis.  First,
knowledge and expertise used to conduct trend analysis must be codified and stored
in the expert system’s knowledge base. Clearly, such capture and formalization is
nontrivial, as this step has long been acknowledged as the bottleneck in ES
development (Jackson, 1990) across nearly every application domain. However, an
effective set of knowledge-engineering tools and techniques has been developed
and refined over the last 40 years, and ES applications have been successfully
implemented in many critical areas, including medicine (e.g., MYCIN; see Shortliffe,
1976), computer design (e.g., R1/XCON; see McDermott, 1982), electronics
troubleshooting (e.g., SOPHIE; see Brown, Burton & de Kleer, 1982) and others.
Although expected to be difficult and time-consuming, acquiring key knowledge
required for effective trend analysis appears to represent an achievable knowledge-
engineering task as well.
Once operational, the expert system would interact with and assist the user in
conducting trend analysis. For instance, certain flight profiles (e.g., course, speed,
altitude, maneuvers) of non-allied aircraft in the region occur routinely and now
appear to be associated with pilot training. But until a trend associated with such
flights can be established, the profiles themselves possibly appear to represent
hostile profiles, and intelligence analysts lacking specific, tacit knowledge associ-
ated with pilot training profiles can lead to overreaction by BG commanders and
crews. Alternatively, an ES could be developed to recognize and correctly interpret
such profiles, just as experienced intelligence analysts do after serving on station for
some time in the region.
Further, once such an expert system has been developed to assist the intelli-
gence staff in conducting trend analysis, the associated knowledge has been made
explicit, and the expert system itself, as an application of information technology,
can be duplicated and transferred from one BG to another. This represents a



















quantum shift in capability regarding knowledge flow in the CVBG enterprise.
Whereas the ships and personnel comprising one BG or another are separate and
distinct (i.e., negligible overlap or interchange of ships or personnel), knowl-
edge captured and formalized via ES can remain on station in a given theater of
operations indefinitely. It therefore serves not only as a repository of intelli-
gence knowledge that can easily be passed between outgoing and incoming
CVBGs, but it can also improve the performance of all subsequent BGs, as this
knowledge may be refined and improved through time. Such use of ES, thus,
represents a fundamental change to our vertical process, which, we reemphasize
is central to KM and knowledge flow.
Migration plan. With these three redesigns, we need to establish a migration
plan for transitioning the intelligence process from its current, baseline or “as is”
configuration. This plan envisions near, medium and far-term migrations that
incorporate the three redesign alternatives developed above. For the near term (i.e.,
immediately), the Navy should continue building repositories for explicit knowl-
edge and making them available to geographically dispersed units via networks.
Compared to paper-based documents and learning such explicit knowledge by trial
and error, network availability represents a qualitative improvement. Rather than
calling this a “redesign” per se, Redesign 1 represents more of a confirmation that
current BG practices and plans appear to be on target in terms of promoting
knowledge flow. Nonetheless, problems noted above with respect to repositories
(e.g., indexing, search) serve to mitigate the efficacy of this approach in terms of
tacit knowledge flow.
Over the medium term (e.g., next 1-2 years), results of this analysis suggest the
Navy should employ groupware technology and apply it as an instrument to facilitate
the exchange of tacit knowledge. As noted above, groupware supports tacit
knowledge exchange with rich communication media that serve as surrogates for
face-to-face conversations, and they enable remote participation in intelligence
processes via moderate telepresence. Interestingly, acknowledging this redesign,
groupware technology is already being implemented within the STENNIS CVBG,
and plans are underway to implement the same groupware technology within other
battle groups as well.
However, problems noted above with respect to groupware (e.g., ephem-
eral knowledge) also serve to mitigate the efficacy of this approach in terms of
knowledge flow. Moreover, if the individual commands do not support this
effort, then relying on personnel to share knowledge or contribute to the
knowledge base is impractical (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Frenzel, 1987;
Russell & Norvig, 1995).
In the far term (e.g., 3-5 years), expert systems should be developed to assist
with and partially automate key aspects of the intelligence process. Once difficulties
with knowledge engineering are overcome, this approach offers great potential to
decrease the acclimation period required by arriving CVBGs. And if the associated
knowledge bases can be updated and refined over time, it is conceivable that the
BGTTP may some day be seamless and transparent; that is, the arriving BG may





















someday be just as capable on Day 1 of operations in theater as its departing
counterpart on Day 90. This would represent a substantial feat in terms of
knowledge flow.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The research described in this paper focuses on knowledge process and
system design from three integrated perspectives: 1) reengineering process
innovation, 2) expert systems knowledge acquisition and representation, and 3)
information systems analysis and design. Building upon prior work, we show
how to integrate these three perspectives in a systematic manner, beginning with
analysis and design of the enterprise process of interest, progressively moving
into knowledge capture and formalization, and then system design and imple-
mentation. With this, we illustrate the use and utility of integrated knowledge
process and system design through an application to the battle group theater
transition process (BGTTP), which represents an extreme example in terms of
knowledge-transfer requirements. This provides a central contribution of the
paper, as it reveals the underlying components of KM, prescribes design
guidance specific to each and demonstrates how the integrated framework for
knowledge process and system design can be effectively applied to a nontrivial,
real-world, knowledge-intensive process.
A number of other important findings and conclusions emerge from this
research. First, an organization must clearly define its goals and CSFs in order to
design a suitable KM system. Otherwise, it will be difficult to identify the
appropriate cross-process flows that nurture knowledge transfer. Second, the paper
reemphasizes the fact that analysis of the process, knowledge and context is
important in designing an appropriate KM system.  Focusing on technology alone
will, more often than not, result in a system that does not serve the organization.
Third, the techniques and technologies identified to redesign intelligence
processes appear to also offer potential for improving other CVBG activities
(e.g., operations), and results of this investigation should help focus and
streamline IS development targeted for the battle group.  Finally, we note that
the forward-presence environment associated with CVBGs represents a unique
context in terms of process performance. But we see no reason why the
integrated framework for process and system design (i.e., as presented and
discussed in the paper) cannot be effectively employed for a variety of other
processes, within the Navy and beyond. Thus, we feel the results of this
investigation are highly generalizable. Indeed, the power of such a framework
may derive from its robustness and broad applicability. And we see a fruitful
line of continued research along these lines.
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